Abstract. In this paper, we propose an efficient authenticated encryption scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography. The proposed scheme does not need to construct any digital signature, so the computation costs can be greatly reduced. In addition, we also use the proposed authenticated encryption scheme to design a secure electronic payment system. The proposed electronic payment system provides the security requirements of confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, privacy protection, and double-spending prevention. According to the results of this paper, the proposed authenticated encryption scheme can be easily implemented in mobile payment environments. Besides, it can be also applied to electronic auction, online meeting, and electronic voting.
Introduction
To authenticate and protect the secret information transmitted between a sender and a receiver on the Internet, the traditional approach is that the sender first uses a digital signature scheme [1] to sign the message. Then, the sender encrypts both the message and the signature using a symmetric encryption algorithm, such as AES [2] or DES [3] . Nevertheless, this kind of "signature-then-encryption" approach has high computation costs. Therefore, Zheng [4] firstly proposed an authenticated encryption scheme (it is also called the signcryption scheme), which combines the functions of the digital signature and encryption schemes in one logical step. Compared with the signature-then-encryption approach, the authenticated encryption scheme has lower computation costs. From then on, various authenticated encryption schemes were proposed [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] .
However, we find that the previous authenticated encryption schemes have to generate and verify the digital signature to accomplish message authentication and confidentiality. For some applications, the receiver only wants to ensure that the message is really sent by the correct sender, but he/she does not want to obtain the sender's signature. In order to confirm the message is really sent by a valid sender, verifying the sender's signature is inefficient for the receiver. Up to now, no research discusses the abovementioned circumstance. In addition, there is no practicable scheme which combines the functions of message authentication and encryption without constructing the digital signature.
Therefore, we propose an efficient authenticated encryption scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). In the proposed scheme, the sender uses his/her private key and the receiver's public key to construct a symmetric key for encrypting the message as a cipher. After that, the receiver can utilize his private key to reconstruct the same symmetric key for decrypting the cipher to obtain the message. Since the symmetric key is constructed by the sender's private key, only the actual sender can encrypt the message. Thus, the receiver can ensure that the message is really sent by an actual sender. Besides, only the designated receiver can decrypt the cipher to obtain the original message because the symmetric key can be also reconstructed by the receiver's private key. Without constructing any digital signature, the proposed authenticated encryption scheme can efficiently accomplish message confidentiality and user authentication at the same time. Compared with the previous authenticated encryption schemes, the proposed scheme does not need to verify the sender's signature so the computation costs can be greatly reduced.
Since the proposed authenticated encryption scheme can accomplish message confidentiality and user authentication efficient, it can be applied to many applications for electronic services, such as electronic payment (e-payment), electronic voting, and online auction. In this paper, we also utilize our authenticated encryption scheme to design an efficient e-payment system on ECC. Because the proposed e-payment system is based on our authenticated encryption scheme, it can efficiently protect the purchasing information and authenticate the message sender at the same time.
In addition, the proposed e-payment system has the advantages of message confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, privacy protection, and doublespending prevention. Therefore, the proposed epayment system provides a secure and practical payment tool for the electronic services. Because the proposed scheme has very low computation costs, it can be also easily applied to mobile payment applications.
Related works
To show that the previous authenticated encryption schemes have to use digital signature for the authentication, we introduce Hwang and Sung's signcryption scheme [11] in this section. In their scheme, only the designated receiver can recover the encrypted message to verify the digital signature. The notations used in Hwang and Sung's scheme are shown in Table 1 . In this phase, the sender Alice signs and encrypts a message m and sends the signcryption messages including the signature (V, S) to the receiver Bob. The steps are shown as follows.
Step 1. Alice randomly chooses two integers R and k in Z q * .
Step 
=
, where "||" is denoted as string concatenation. 
The unsigncryption phase:
In this phase, Bob decrypts the cipher C to obtain the message m and verifies the signature (V, S) to authenticate Alice.
Step Similarly, the previous authenticated encryption schemes [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] have the above-mentioned drawbacks. That is, all these schemes have to construct and verify the digital signature for the authentication. To overcome the above drawbacks, we propose a new authenticated encryption scheme without constructing digital signature in the next section. 
The proposed authenticated encryption scheme and its applications
In this section, we propose an efficient authenticated encryption scheme without involving the digital signature. In addition, we also use the authenticated encryption scheme to design an electronic payment system.
An efficient authenticated encryption scheme
To reduce the computation cost, we adopt elliptic curve cryptography [13] [14] [15] to design our authenticated encryption scheme. The proposed scheme is divided into three phases: the initialization phase, the authenticated encryption phase, and the verification phase.
The initialization phase:
In this phase, the system initializes and selects some parameters as follows.
Step 1. Choose a finite field over a large odd prime 160 2 > q .
Step 2. Choose an elliptic curve equation q b a ≠ + [13, 14] .
Step 3. Choose the symmetric encryption/decryption system
, where k is the symmetric key.
Step 4. Choose a public point Q over
with the order n.
Step 5. Publish
, and Q to all users.
The authenticated encryption phase:
In this phase, the sender Alice wants to send a message M to the receiver Bob. Then, Alice computes a common symmetric key to encrypt M such that only Bob can decrypt the cipher to obtain M. Assume that Alice has the private key from the certificate authority. Now, we describe this phase as follows.
Step 1. Alice verifies Bob's public key B U by using the corresponding certificate.
Step 2. Alice randomly chooses an integer
Step 3. Alice computes 
The verification phase:
In this phase, Bob decrypts the cipher C to obtain the message M, and he verifies that if M is really sent by Alice.
Step 1. After receiving (C, R, T), Bob computes
to obtain the common symmetric key 1 k .
Step 2. Bob uses 1 k to decrypt the cipher by the proposed scheme can accomplish the requirements of authentication and confidentiality at the same time, which satisfies the property of authenticated encryption scheme. According to the proposed scheme, it has the following advantages. First, no digital signature is involved in the proposed scheme so it is more efficient than the related works. Second, the proposed scheme provides the anonymity because only the intended receiver can decrypt the cipher to get the sender's identity. This property is very useful for some applications such as electronic payment (e-payment), electronic voting (e-voting), and online auction, which can be implemented by the authenticated encryption scheme. 
An e-payment system using the proposed authenticated encryption scheme
The proposed authenticated encryption scheme provides the user authentication and the message encryption at the same time. Thus, it can be applied to various applications on the Internet, such as epayment, online meeting, and e-voting. In these applications, the e-payment is the most popular research topic so many e-payment systems [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] have been proposed in recent years. In this subsection, we show how to use the proposed scheme to implement an e-payment system as follows. The proposed e-payment system is divided into five phases: the initializing phase, the buying phase, the paying phase, the exchanging phase, and the transferring phase. In addition, the participants of the proposed system are the payer, the merchant, and the bank. Both the payer and the merchant already have their own accounts in the bank. The buying, paying, and exchanging phases are illustrated in Figures 3 to  5 , respectively. The details of the proposed e-payment system are as follows.
The initializing phase:
In this phase, the system initializes the public parameters
, and Q defined in Section 3. In addition, the system publishes
, and Q.
The buying phase:
In this phase, the payer (Alice) downloads good information (GI) that he/she wants to buy from the merchant's website. Here, the goods may be the electronic goods such as software, music, or movie. Then, Alice uses GI to generate the payment information and utilizes the proposed authenticated encryption scheme to encrypt the payment information. In addition, she sends the encrypted information to the bank for paying the money. In this e-payment scheme, Alice, the bank, and the merchant have their private/public key pairs In this phase, the bank withdraws the money from Alice's account and deposits it to a temporary account. Then, the bank generates a digital signature (DS) to be Alice's payment information. Note that DS is also the payment proof which implies Alice has already paid the money. Step 2. The bank also checks if 1 k is equal to the key computed in Step 1. If 1 T and 1 k are both correct, then the bank accepts this transaction. Otherwise, the bank rejects it.
Step 3. According to A ID and P, the bank withdraws the money from Alice's account and deposits the money to a temporary account. Next, the bank computes = ‖ , where E is the expiration date. The bank also uses B d to generate a digital signature DS of M by using any ECC-based signature scheme such as [21, 22] . Then, the bank records {DS, M} in its database.
Step 5. 
Figure 4. The paying phase
The exchanging phase: In this phase, Alice utilizes the signature DS as the paying proof, and she sends the encrypted paying proof to the merchant for exchanging the goods.
Step 1. Alice randomly selects an integer
Step 2. Alice uses 
Then, the merchant checks if 1 ′ and 3 are correct or not. If they are both correct, then the merchant accepts this transaction. Otherwise, the merchant rejects it.
Step 4. According to GI, the merchant computes Step 5. Alice can obtain the electronic goods that she wants to buy.
Figure 5. The exchanging phase
The transferring phase: If Alice does not receive the goods, she will ask the bank to stop the transaction in this phase. Besides, the merchant can send the payment proof to the bank, and then the bank deposits the money to the merchant's account.
Step 1. Until the expiration date exceeds, the merchant can use DS to ask the bank to transfer the corresponding payment to its account.
Step 2. If Alice does not receive the goods before the expiration date, Alice can ask the bank to terminate this transaction. Then, the bank transfers the payment from the temporary account back to Alice's account.
Step 3. After transferring the payment from the temporary account to the merchant's account (or Alice's account), the bank removes the record {DS, M} from its database.
The e-payment system can provide secure transactions because the proposed authenticated encryption scheme is used. In addition, the proposed e-payment system is an efficient e-payment tool, which provides message confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, privacy protection, and double-spending prevention for the electronic transactions on Internet.
The above-mentioned advantages of the e-payment system are discussed in the next section.
Discussions
In this section, we discuss the security of the proposed authenticated encryption scheme by performing some possible attacks on it. In addition, we also show how the proposed e-payment system can accomplish the properties of confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, privacy protection, and doublespending prevention.
Security analysis
In this subsection, we perform some possible attacks on the proposed authenticated scheme to analyze its security as follows.
Replay attack:
Assume that an attacker wiretaps the communication between the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob), and the attacker can obtain the message (C, R, T), where
Then, the attacker may re-send (C, R, T) to Bob to pretend that he/she is Alice. However, this attack is infeasible because C contains the timestamp T, which denotes the real sending time. That is, Bob can discover the message (C, R, T) is sent from an attacker by checking T. Therefore, the proposed scheme can prevent the replay attack.
Outsider attack:
Assume that an attacker collects the information (C, R, T) from the communication between Alice and Bob. Then, the attacker tries to get the message M form C. To decrypt C, the attacker has to know the symmetric key k 1 . However, the attacker cannot obtain k 1 which is computed by ) , ( *
This attack is impossible because the attacker needs to face the difficulty of elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECDLP) [13, 14] . Therefore, the outsider attack does not work for the proposed scheme.
Impersonating attack:
Assume that an attacker impersonates Alice to send a forged message to Bob, and then he/she randomly chooses an integer
Thus, the attacker chooses a forged private key
, and
Then, the attacker sends ( ′ , ′ , ′ ) to Bob and pretends he/she is Alice. However, the impersonating attack is impossible because Bob computes the symmetric key
Thus, Bob cannot compute the correct key to decrypt the cipher ′ . That is, Bob will find that the attacker is not Alice. According to the above reason, the proposed scheme can prevent the impersonating attack.
Server spoofing attack:
Assume that an attacker wants to pretend that he is a bank server. Then, the attacker uses a forged ' 
Man-in-the-middle attack:
Assume that an attacker wiretaps the communication to get the payment information ) , , ( T T ≠ . Thus, the man-in-the-middle attack is infeasible for the proposed scheme.
Identity theft attack:
The identity theft attack means that an attacker has already obtained the user's identity and some other information kept in user's device. Then, the attacker can use the information to impersonate a legal user. However, the user does not need to keep any information in user's side. In addition, the proposed scheme does not require the user's identity for authentication and verification. According to the above analysis, the identity theft attack is impossible for the proposed scheme.
The advantages of the proposed e-payment system
The proposed e-payment system has the following advantages: confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, privacy protection, and double-spending prevention. These advantages are discussed as follows.
Confidentiality:
The proposed e-payment system provides message confidentiality because it is designed by the authenticated encryption scheme of Subsection 3.1. In the proposed e-payment system, the secret messages are encrypted by a symmetric encryption algorithm. An attacker has to know the symmetric keys 1 does not know these private keys. That is, only the designated receiver, who has the correct private key, has the ability to decrypt the cipher.
Authenticity:
The proposed payment system provides authenticity because it is designed by the authenticated encryption scheme of Subsection 3. 
Thus, Alice can ensure that the message
is really sent from the bank without verifying DS.
Integrity:
The proposed e-payment system provides the message integrity because the payment information is sent by the ciphertext form, such as 1 C , 2 C , and 3
C .
No one can alter the payment information without knowing the symmetric keys 1 k and
T is changed by an attacker, the valid receivers can discover the change by decrypting the cipher to check them. According to the above reasons, the proposed e-payment system provides the message integrity.
Privacy protection:
The proposed e-payment system protects the buying privacy because the goods information GI is protected by the one-way hash function
, and thus the buying privacy can be protected from the bank. Besides, the payer's identification is not sent to the merchant in the exchanging phase. Moreover, the digital signature DS does not contain any payer's information. Therefore, the merchant does not know who the payer is. According to the above reasons, the buying privacy can be protected in the proposed epayment system.
Double-Spending prevention:
Assume that Alice re-sends a used payment proof DS to the merchant for paying again. In this case, the merchant will discover the double-spending behavior because {DS, M} is still stored in the merchant's database. Similarly, the merchant cannot use DS for asking the bank to transfer the money again. This is because that the bank also keeps the record {DS, M} in its database. According to the above discussions, the double spending does not occur in the proposed epayment system.
The performance analysis
In the subsection, we analyze the computation costs of the related e-payment schemes. Table 2 shows the computation costs of Wang et al.'s scheme [23] , Oros and Popescu's scheme [24] , and the proposed scheme. 
Oros and Popescu's Ours
Buying phase 9ME 8PM 3PM+1SY Paying phase 11ME 2PM+3PA 1PM+2SY Exchanging phase 5ME 3PA 4PM+2SY Total costs 25ME 10PM+6PA 8PM+5SY
In Table 2 , ME, PM, PA, and SY are modular exponentiation, point multiplication on ECC, pairing computation on ECC, and symmetric cryptosystem computations, respectively. In fact, the magnitude of these computation costs can be denoted as ME>PA>PM>SY. According to Table 2 , the computation cost of the proposed scheme is much less than those of the related approaches.
Conclusions
To eliminate the computation costs of the digital signature, we propose an efficient authenticated encryption scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography in this paper. The proposed scheme can efficiently accomplish the message encryption and authentication at the same time. Compared with the related works, the proposed scheme is more efficient because it does not need to compute any digital signature. Besides, we also use the proposed authenticated encryption scheme to implement an epayment system in this paper. Since the authenticated encryption scheme is used, the proposed e-payment system provides confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, privacy protection, and double-spending prevention. According to the results of this paper, the proposed authenticated encryption scheme can be easily applied to mobile payment applications in the future.
